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Introduction 
 
Beginning with the divestment campaigns of the 1970s, shareholder pressure on 
companies to disclose their impact on global communities has been broadening and 
increasing.  Shareholder resolutions addressing toxic waste, executive compensation, the 
inclusion of gender identity in Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) policies, and most 
recently, corporate political contributions, have created consumer, stakeholder, and 
employee awareness of the impact of corporate behavior on public perception and company 
value.  In response to this type of stakeholder engagement, as well as media coverage of 
corporate impact on communities, many public companies have chosen to preempt 
concerns about their environment, sustainability, and corporate governance (ESG) records.1 
Rather than simply adhering to local or federal laws as standards for good behavior, these 
                                                          
1 This is exemplified by IBM’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) consulting practice advising firms on how to utilize CSR 
to  “Strengthen your competitive position and help build a smarter planet: Integrate Corporate Social Responsibility and Green 
into your core business strategy” http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/gbs/bus/html/gbs-green-csr.html.  
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companies have hired teams of employees to develop, identify, and broadcast corporate 
values and “good works” to investors and consumers alike.  
However, do stated company values truly act as the moral compass for company behavior?  
Or does marketing hype create a screen for companies to appear as good citizens, while 
relying on government regulation as the minimum guideline for appropriate behavior?  We 
believe that a company takes the high road when its values are clearly defined and its 
activities in the global community reflect adherence to its self-defined values. As 
shareholders, we invest in companies because we make a choice, based on available data, 
to participate in the profit from the company’s sales of goods and services.  When the data 
we examine is misrepresented, shareholder value is put at risk. As socially responsible 
investors, we do not limit our scope of concern to corporate accounting scandals. We 
examine stated company values and the degree to which those values are reflected in 
company behavior. When we identify discrepancies, we seek stakeholder engagement as a 
remedy.  Most recently, we have focused on the nexus of company values and their political 
contributions. 
 
Given the unprecedented public policy outcry resulting from the Supreme Court decision in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 2 our firm, NorthStar Asset Management, Inc., 
examined the treasury and Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions of the companies 
on our firm’s “buy list,” as compared to the voting records of politicians who received their 
contributions. At each company, we examined the EEO policies related to protections in the 
area of sexual orientation, as well as the company’s stance on environmental concerns.  We 
found that stated company values were not reflected in the voting records of the companies’ 
supported politicians, and in many cases, the stated views of the supported politicians were 
in direct opposition to company values.   
 
We believe that if corporate political contributions violate company values, then corporations 
are risking the good name of the company and, consequently, shareholder value.  Corporate 
contributions that contradict company values pose a direct and immediate risk to 
shareholder value.  Our perspective is that in order to minimize this risk, corporate 
standards for political giving must include a congruency analysis between anticipated 
political spending and the company’s values.  And further, that because it is shareholders 
who are placed at risk through poor management decisions on political spending, the onus 
is on shareholders to pre-approve political spending decisions. 
 
History 
 
For several years, shareholder activists have engaged companies regarding their corporate 
political spending. Since Citizens United, corporate exposure surrounding political giving has 
been reported on widely, and in some cases, has led to public scrutiny, criticism, and 
diminished shareholder value (Coates, 2010). Historically, shareholder resolutions have 
asked exclusively for disclosure of political spending (Hyatt, 2010). These resolutions are 
essential for two reasons. First, shareholder rights concerning issues of corporate executive 
compensation progressed from simply seeking disclosure to insisting upon shareholder 
advisory votes which increased “accountability, transparency, and performance linkage of 
executive pay” (Ferri & Maber quoting Baird & Stowasser, 2011), Second, such broadening 
                                                          
2 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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shareholder input regarding political contributions can similarly provide necessary checks 
and balances.   
 
Unfortunately, it appears that the singular focus of past shareholder resolutions on 
disclosure has led to a phenomenon in which companies believe that disclosure is the most 
stringent requirement by which they must abide. Corporations seem to believe that if 
management or company political action committees (PACs) simply disclose in arrears the 
extent of their political giving, then this is sufficient for shareholder and consumer 
satisfaction. The view prevails that our firm’s engagement with corporations and 
correspondence with the Securities and Exchange Commission indicates the misconception 
that we are simply requesting disclosure.3  
 
Currently, there is no process to hold management accountable for actual disclosed 
contributions to candidates working against company values. Shareholder reaction or public 
outcry against particularly egregious violations is happenstance. The focus of shareholder 
resolutions solely on disclosure has failed because it does not provide shareholders a way to 
voice an opinion on political contributions. This has two consequences: (1) the company 
(management and the board) assumes it can spend company resources promoting its views 
of what constitutes corporate “interests;” and (2) in our experience, the company may not 
know that these candidates uphold political policies divergent from company values. Given 
our concerns and fiduciary duty to protect our clients’ assets, and because of the close 
relationship between the company value and company values, we feel shareholders must 
weigh in on all corporate political activity in advance of the actual contribution. 
 
Who Decides Where The Money Goes? 
 
The burden of making appropriate political contribution decisions from both the general 
company treasury (state, local, and private political committee giving) and the company PAC 
(state, local, federal, and PAC sources) are at the discretion of management despite the fact 
that poorly used funds ultimately impact shareholder value. Corporations are permitted to 
contribute to federal elections only via PAC contributions.  Only eighty-eight companies in the 
Fortune 500 disclose their company treasury electioneering contributions and all Fortune 
500 companies disclose their PAC contributions as required by law (Alpern, 2011).   
 
Unfortunately, after our examination of underlying values as self-described by corporations 
in their publicly available media as well as employee policies, with their political 
contributions through both treasury (where available) and PAC funds, we found glaring 
inconsistencies in corporate values and the values inherently expressed by support of 
various candidates for political office.  This was true not only in corporations who disclose 
their treasury contributions, but even in those companies who denounce treasury 
contributions in favor of PAC contributions.4 In each case, while well-meaning management 
teams supported candidates who were deemed to be working in the best interest of the 
company, corporate values relating to employment non-discrimination policies, 
environmental standards, and immigrant rights were consistently violated when 
contributions were made. Management apparently lacked the skills and knowledge to 
                                                          
3 This is reflected in the SEC’s response to FedEx’s no action request letter, in which the NorthStar “say on political 
contributions” proposal was omitted for being “duplicative” of another shareholder proposal which simply requested disclosure.  
4 In particular, here we are referring to our engagement with Procter & Gamble, which does not make treasury contributions, 
preferring to rely upon a PAC. 
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evaluate candidates or chose not to do so based on support of or opposition to the 
comprehensive goals and values of their own contributing businesses.   
 
Our firm has yet to find one corporation that regularly compares its values to an analysis of 
the politicians and political groups it supports (DeNicola, et al, 2010) despite the fact that 
the corporate standard advocated by The Conference Board (TCB) in its recently published 
Handbook on Corporate Political Activity recommends corporations review their political 
expenditures to “examine the proposed expenditures to ensure that they are in line with the 
company’s values and publicly stated policies, positions, and business strategies and that 
they do not pose reputational, legal, or other risks to the company.” 
 
We again consider the fact that perhaps the solitary focus of disclosure in past shareholder 
engagement with corporations is partially at fault as it has failed to encourage corporations 
to do anything more than consider disclosing these contributions. In our engagement efforts, 
it has been clear that the novel idea of congruency with self-defined corporate values had 
never been considered previously, despite volatile public issues such as the 2010 clash 
between Target Corporation’s political contribution and the backlash suffered due to that 
donation’s clearly values-incongruent nature (further described below). Because the board 
of directors and other upper management officials make all decisions regarding the 
destinations of company treasury and company PAC contributions, management must take 
into account potential discrepancies between company values and supported politicians, as 
well as the fact that sets of contributions risk company brand name, reputation, and 
shareholder value. While these officials seem to be slowly coming around to the idea of 
disclosing these contributions, they are failing to understand that political contributions 
must reflect company values. 
 
Specific Violations of Company Values 
 
In July 2010, Target Corporation donated $150,000 to the political group Minnesota 
Forward, which ignited a major national controversy with demonstrations, petitions, 
threatened boycotts, and substantial negative publicity (Martiga, 2010). This controversy, 
combined with the negative fallout from the Citizens United case, caused us to carefully 
examine the treasury and Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions of the companies 
on our firm’s “buy list” (those corporations with stated company values) as compared to the 
voting records of politicians who received their contributions. We uncovered patterns of 
political activity that were inconsistent with companies’ policies of non-discrimination based 
on sexual orientation, gender identity, or expression: 
 
Home Depot. One particular donation was in support of Governor Bob McDonnell (Home 
Depot Corporate Political Contributions Annual Report, 2010), whose objective was to 
eliminate non-discrimination protections for LGBT state workers in Virginia.  McDonnell was 
successful in this regard. We also identified a number of other particularly egregious 
donations that are detailed in NorthStar’s no-action letter response published by the 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC, Home Depot, Inc. Division of Corporation Finance, 
2011). 
 
FedExPAC. The U.S. Senate campaign for David Vitter received $6,500 during the 2009-
2010 election cycle from FedEx (FedExPAC, 2010). As a sitting U.S. Senator, David Vitter 
was an original co-author of and voted for the Federal Marriage Amendment that would have 
effectively eliminated same-sex marriage in all states where it is currently legal and would 
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further have prevented any states from adopting same-sex marriage legislation in the future. 
This position against same-sex marriage stands in direct violation of the FedEx commitment 
to provide same-sex, domestic partner benefits and same-sex marriage benefits (in states 
where it is legal) to all U.S.-based employees by January 1, 2012 (Molinet, 2010). 
 
Eight additional co-sponsors of the anti-LGBT Marriage Protection Amendment in the U.S. 
Senate also received contributions from the FedEx PAC and include Senators Brownback, 
Chambliss, Crapo, DeMint, Enzi, Isakson, Roberts, and Thune (Senate Joint Resolutions, 
2005 and 2008). Furthermore, candidates receiving FedExPAC contributions voted against 
hate crimes bills and the repeal of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy that prohibits LGBT service 
members from serving openly. 
 
P&G PAC. David Vitter received $2,000 in 2009 and another $3,000 in 2010 (Federal 
Election Commission Summary Reports). He not only co-authored the Federal Marriage 
Amendment, but in July 2007, Vitter was “identified as a client of a prostitution service” 
(Keilar, 2007) yet continues to serve in the Senate. Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator from Iowa, 
has been linked (Sharlet, 2009) as having ties, as far back the 1980s, to the “C Street,” 
radical right, anti-gay group known for its support of the “Kill the Gays Bill” in Uganda (Center 
for Constitutional Rights, May, 2011; Metro Weekly, 2010). Senators Burr, Crapo, DeMint, 
Isakson, and Kyl  all recipients of PAC money  officially endorsed the Federal Marriage 
Amendment as co-sponsors. Many of the officials supported by P&G PAC contributions also 
voted for the Federal Marriage Amendment and voted against hate crimes bills and the 
repeal of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy (U.S. Congressional Voting Records, 111th Congress).  
 
A company’s EEO policy, non-discrimination policy, and values statements comprise the 
company’s set of public values, and hence, to abide by the Handbook on Corporate Political 
Activity, all corporate political activity and contributions should consistently reflect these 
values whether contributions are made to political organizations or directly to political 
candidates. Yet even the above examples, focusing only on EEO values, indicate that 
management has acted in violation of stated company values.  We believe that because 
management and/or the company board of directors is responsible for determining the 
recipients of company PAC giving as well as corporate treasury political spending decisions    
and yet the above types of incongruent decisions are commonplace    stakeholders must 
ensure that management does not blindly approve political contributions that contradict 
company values.  Disclosure of political contributions after the fact does not repair harm 
created by inconsistent actions.  
 
We believe that a company’s political activities become our concern when: 
 
1. Company resources of any kind are used to make or direct political contributions for any 
reason. 
 
2. A contribution to a candidate actively works against the values of the company or creates 
potential damage to the company and its employees, customers, or shareholder value. 
 
3. We bring concerns about risks created by political giving to management’s attention and 
management fails to address     or in the case of Home Depot, even notice     the 
brand, reputational, or legal risks to the company. 
 
6 
4. Investment managers with a fiduciary responsibility to address significant risks to 
shareholder value with management, the board of directors, and the owners 
rubberstamp approval on incongruent corporate expression of values.   
 
5. Supreme Court opinions like those expressed by Justice Kennedy writing for the majority 
in Citizens United insist that we, as shareholders, correct misdoings by management, 
through the “procedures of corporate democracy.”5 
 
Inconsistencies shown between corporations’ publicly-stated values (e.g., environmental and 
health care policies, compensation and pension packages, and employee benefit issues) 
and their support of specific candidates whose public policy and government regulatory 
positions are in violation of company values can directly harm shareholder value.   
 
A Vote on Corporate Political Spending 
 
When NorthStar began to take a closer look at the political activities of companies in our 
portfolio, we took into consideration approaches pursued by the Center for Political 
Accountability (CPA) and other social investors, notably Walden Asset Management and 
Trillium Asset Management. We concluded, as mentioned above, that disclosure of political 
spending alone does not sufficiently address discrepancies between corporate values and 
the values of endorsed candidates or political entities.6 As fiduciaries, we are concerned 
that political spending decisions by management, which are intended as beneficial to 
company value, may work at cross purposes. In addition, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
for the court in Citizens United placed the onus on shareholders in a corporate democracy to 
keep management’s political activities in check, such that we, as representatives of 
shareholders in the proxy process, must use our votes to uphold or dissuade management 
from potential conflicts.  As a result of that investigation, NorthStar crafted and filed its first 
round of shareholder proposals at Home Depot,7 FedEx,8 and Procter & Gamble (P&G),9 for 
the 2011 shareholder meetings, decrying corporate political activity incongruent with 
publicly-stated values and seeking a shareholder vote on corporate political activity.  We 
have similarly pursued eight companies on the same issue for the 2012 shareholder 
meetings (i.e., Chubb, Intel, Google, Home Depot, Praxair, Ecolab, Johnson & Johnson, and 
Western Union). 
                                                          
5 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 902 (2010).    
6 Objections to providing a shareholder vote on political contributions have consisted of two main points: 1) that institutional 
investors will vote with management and the resolutions will therefore fail; and 2) that providing a vote will reduce discussions 
with management. The first point is countered directly by the experience of shareholder resolutions calling for disclosure of 
political contributions which first averaged under 10 percent of the vote, more recently culminating with the first such resolution 
to receive a majority (53.3 percent) of total shareholder votes cast for and against it at Sprint Nextel's annual meeting (2011).  As 
to the second issue, our experience has been that shareholder resolutions calling for a shareholder vote actually provide a new 
opportunity for discussions with management that are absent when the company has already complied with disclosure of 
contributions and therefore has no basis for continued discussion around disclosure. A third point that critics have missed is that 
providing a shareholder vote is a better option for shareholders to preserve company value than waiting for public outrage and its 
attendant damage. For further reference, see http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/5379.   
7 This proposal was filed at Home Depot on 12/7/2010; it was challenged by the company at the SEC, however we prevailed and 
the proposal was put up for a shareholder vote on 6/2/2011.  The proposal can be found in the 2011 Home Depot proxy booklet, 
available on the SEC’s website: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/354950/00011931 2511098642/ddef14a.htm.  
8 This proposal was filed at FedEx on 4/15/2011, and was challenged at the SEC by the company.  The proposal was 
subsequently excluded from the FedEx proxy on 7/21/2011 based on a claim that it substantially duplicated a proposal from the 
Comptroller of the City of New York, filed on 4/1/2011, which FedEx received first and which will be included. 
9 The proposal was filed at P&G on 4/28/2011, and was put up for a shareholder vote on October 11, 2011. The proposal can be 
found in the P&G proxy booklet, available on the SEC’s website: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar 
/data/80424/000119312511233301/ddef14a.htm.  
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Our perspective is that corporate standards for political giving must include an analysis of 
anticipated political spending for congruency with the company’s values to minimize risk to 
shareholder value.  
 
Support for this approach is evidenced by: 
 
 When the  Supreme Court, in its Citizens United ruling in 2010, interpreted the First 
Amendment right of freedom of speech to include certain corporate political 
expenditures involving “electioneering communications,” striking down elements of the 
previously well-established McCain-Feingold law. The decision itself required the remedy 
of “potential abuses” through “procedures of corporate democracy.”10 
 
 NorthStar’s decision to seek a shareholder vote on political contributions was lauded by 
John C. Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group, in making the case for a shareholder vote 
on political contributions. In his New York Times editorial, Bogle explains that “In the 
Home Depot case, which was brought by NorthStar Asset Management, a Boston money 
manager, a vigilant S.E.C. [Securities and Exchange Commission] has allowed our 
shareholders to take that first step toward [corporate] democracy” (Bogle, 2011). Bogle 
argues that self-interested managers “exploit provisions in the law…to make lavish 
political contributions without disclosure… and subvert our political system,” which can 
only be corrected by imposing a requirement for a binding “supermajority” (75%) 
shareholder vote on political contributions. Bogle also addresses the concern that “our 
nation’s money managers now hold[ing] 70 percent of all shares of American 
corporations…have not always honored [the] responsibility to vote,” pointing out that 
“mutual funds, our largest holders of stocks, are now required to publicly report how they 
voted during the year,” finally giving shareholders the means to hold financial institutions 
accountable as well (Bogle, 2011).  
 
 “The standard (under Delaware corporate law) requires a unanimous shareholder vote to 
ratify a gift of corporate assets other than for charitable purposes” (Bogle, 2011). 
 
 In allowing NorthStar’s resolution, the SEC agreed with NorthStar’s view that seeking an 
advisory vote on electioneering contributions is a shareholder right. Importantly, the 
SEC’s decision to allow the Home Depot resolution also established that NorthStar’s 
proposal was a significant social policy issue of concern to shareholders, addressed 
issues outside the ordinary business of the firm, was clearly defined, and that giving 
shareholders a vote goes beyond disclosure (Home Depot, Inc. Division of Corporation 
Finance, 2011). 
 
 On July 13, 2011, congressional leaders Representative Michael Capuano, Senator 
Robert Menendez, and Senator Richard Blumenthal re-introduced the Shareholder 
Protection Act,11 a bill that would allow shareholders of public companies to vote 
annually on political spending. NorthStar signed a coalition letter to Congress supporting 
the Shareholder Protection Act. The coalition letter stated: “Responsible corporate 
governance requires the involvement of informed shareholders and is not a partisan 
issue. We believe that holding management accountable and ensuring that political 
                                                          
10 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010). 
11 See “Shareholder Protection Act of 2010.” GovTrack.us, available at:  http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.x pd? Bi ll= 
h11 1-4790. 
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spending decisions are made transparently and in pursuit of sound business is 
important for both the market and for democracy.“12 
 
Increasingly, shareholders are asking for more accountability and even evidence of value 
received for corporate political expenditures. When contributions are made to candidates via 
corporate treasury funds or through PAC funds that violate the same corporation’s policies 
and values, shareholder value is put at risk. Greater oversight requires that shareholders 
and their fiduciaries be allowed an opportunity to weigh in on all of the company’s political 
contributions before incongruent contributions occur. 
 
In our experiences, company management states that compliance with election laws is the 
standard for directing contributions to political candidates13 – even when candidates’ 
political positions violate the company’s policies and publicly-stated values. However, 
guidance provided by the CFA Institute’s Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional 
Conduct states “in the event of conflict, Members and Candidates must comply with the 
more strict law, rule, or regulation” (CFA Institute Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional 
Conduct, 2010). We believe this must include the company’s own internal governing policies 
so as to avoid bias that reflects personal views and interests rather than those of the 
company as stated in company policies. As owners, we believe that the criteria for the 
company’s political activities should be the higher of company standards or legal 
requirements, rather than the minimum (legal) standard referenced by management. 
 
Furthermore, some of our colleagues have asserted that corporate PAC contributions should 
not be subjected to shareholder scrutiny through an advisory vote (Smith, 2011). NorthStar 
maintains that PACs carry the same brand and reputational risks to shareholder value as 
any other corporate political activity. PACs are formed by the company, expenses are paid by 
the company, the name or brand of the company is used in association with the PAC, the 
PAC solicits both shareholders and salaried employees for contributions to the PAC, and 
senior management exercises discretion over the money.14 Therefore, we maintain, 
shareholder scrutiny and input in advance of these PAC contributions are necessary to 
mitigate risk and safeguard shareholder value. 
 
Summary 
 
We believe that there is a need to hold companies accountable for all aspects of their public 
actions. Incongruities in their public actions – whether or not we have had successful prior 
shareholder engagements or whether the source of the contribution is from a Political Action 
Committee (PAC) or by the company – are inherently problematic.   
 
Shareholder value can be diminished by negative publicity associated with political giving 
that is incongruent with company values. Political spending decisions that are wholly 
dependent on the will and vision of a management without oversight to ensure that these 
decisions are in line with company values exposes the company to unnecessary risk.  
Governing policies that allow management to exercise personal views and interests rather 
than reflect corporate values potentially serve to harm company image and increase 
                                                          
12 See “Coalition Letter in Support of the Shareholder Protection Act.” Corporate Reform Coalition, http://corporatereform 
coalition.org/?p=282.      
13 Blackburn, Kenneth (Senior Counsel, Legal Division, Procter & Gamble) personal correspondence to J. Goodridge, CEO of 
NorthStar Asset Management, Inc.), dated July 27, 2011.  
14 11 Code of Federal Regulations, 110.5, et seq. [Federal Elections]. 
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shareowner risk. As shareholders and fiduciaries, we believe that the criteria for the 
company’s political activities should be based upon not solely legal requirements, but also 
on considerations of the company internal values as a higher standard. At this time of 
heightened public scrutiny of corporate political involvement, all shareholders need to the 
opportunity to evaluate management’s decisions and vote on political spending to avert 
potential loss of shareholder value. 
 
The Target Corporation debacle of the summer of 2010 resoundingly demonstrated that 
shareholder value is at risk when contributions are made in violation of company values.  As 
investment advisers, financial professionals, and shareholders, we must exercise our 
fiduciary responsibility and intervene when warranted to provide checks and balances on 
corporate political activities. 
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